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I. INTRODUCTION
Area 51 and a completely impartial jury have a lot in
common. Both are often discussed and bring about similar
questions. Has anyone actually seen it? Does it really exist? Is it
even possible? Although Area 51 is an interesting topic, society
today should be more concerned with a defendant’s right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.
“It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states
the law to the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts
as the jury finds them.”1 Although the jury is the fact finder, the
facts must be found only from the admissible evidence.2 However,
* JD, UIC John Marshall Law School 2021. I would like to thank Madison
Hynes, Lexi Hudson, Monica Smit, Jesse Carbonaro, Brooke Payton, and the
UIC JMLS Law Review Board for their thoughtful edits and guidance.
1. See Delli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957) (determining that
the jury system would make little sense if the court was unable to proceed on
the basis that the jury will abide by the court’s instructions). This faith in the
jury’s ability to follow the court’s instructions, “has produced one of the most
valuable and practical mechanisms in human experience for dispensing
substantial justice.” Id.
2. How Courts Work – Courts and Legal Procedure, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9,
2019),
627
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will a juror’s own life experiences allow that juror to examine the
facts without bias? Jurors make decisions in the same way as
every other person does, only it is done in a setting that is unlike
that of “everyday individual decision-making.”3 Being a part of a
trial can be difficult, and it can leave jurors open to cognitive
shortcuts or unconscious biases that may influence the decisions
they make.4 This does not mean that jurors are “not intelligent
enough to make decisions in complex cases, that their decisions
are arbitrary and baseless, or that passion drives every verdict.”5
This is to say it is not possible for a court to erase the minds of
each juror prior to trial or to instruct a juror to disregard their own
life experiences.6 But there are steps that can be taken, by the
court, to provide the best chance for an impartial jury.
This Comment will discuss the general rule that jurors must
set aside their opinions and life experiences, but also the modern
trend that jurors are expected to use their own life experiences
when evaluating the evidence.7 Part II will explore how courts
have interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial
jury.8 Part III will discuss the view by courts when the jurors’ life
experience is similar to the facts of the case.9 Finally, this
Comment will propose that a juror should not reject his own life
experiences, and that a uniform analysis and statute should be
www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_educati
on_network/how_courts_work/jury_role/ [perma.cc/JL7Z-QCCR] (stating the
“judge instructs the jury on the legal principles or rules that must be followed
in weighing the facts”).
3. Sonia Chopra, The Psychology of Jurors’ Decision-Making, PLAINTIFF
MAG. (Jan. 2018), www.plaintiffmagazine.com/item/the-psychology-of-jurorsdecision-making [perma.cc/MJY8-E2CU].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 448, 116 N.E.3d 609, 615
(2019).
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id.
9. Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 1063 (Colo. 2011). “[J]urors may use
their background, including professional and educational experiences, to
inform their deliberations so long as they do not introduce legal content or
specific factual information learned from outside the record.” Id. The court
held that the jury was not exposed to extraneous prejudicial information
because the juror simply used her “professional experience and her knowledge
of mathematics” with the evidence presented at trial. Id.
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implemented by all courts when evaluating a prospective juror’s
life experiences.

II.

BACKGROUND

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
entitles a criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury.10 Each
juror must be “impartial as to the persons involved and
unprejudiced and uncommitted as to the defendant['s] guilt or past
misconduct.”11 A jury is selected at random and is a representation
of the community.12 A jury provides the people a voice in the
administration of justice.13 Although, a single juror’s bias or
prejudice can violate the guarantee provided by the Sixth
Amendment.14
There is a judicial process that courts follow when selecting a
jury. First, the potential jurors are asked questions by the judge
and attorneys from both sides to determine if they are competent
to be on the jury for the case.15 Then, the trial judge begins by
asking the prospective jurors to determine if they can legally serve
on the jury.16 The purpose of this is to make sure that the jurors
will not suffer any undue hardship if they are selected to serve on
the jury.17 Next, the lawyers ask the potential jurors questions
10. Williams, 481 Mass. at 447; John Shea, Defense of the Jury System, 4
NOTRE DAME L.J. 543, 544 (1929).
The right of trial by jury is a fundamental and integral part of a
democracy as the right of suffrage or the freedom of worship, press and
speech. It is engrafted as a part of our jurisprudence as the result of
conflict and sacrifice. It is one of the terms of Magna Carta. There are
two articles relating to it in the Bill of Rights of the Federal
Constitution.
Id.
11. Williams, 481 Mass. at 447 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355
Mass, 509, 512, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969)).
12. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.
2014).
13. Robert C. Walters, Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional
Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 320 (2005) (stating “[n]early 70% of Americans
believe that the right to have disputes decided by a jury of ordinary, randomly
selected citizens is the most important element in the legitimacy of the court
system in the United States”).
14. See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that “[t]he presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a
new trial without a showing of actual prejudice”).
15. Williams, 481 Mass. at 447.
16. Sherilyn Streicker, Jury Selection in Criminal Cases, NOLO,
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/jury-selection-criminal-cases.html
[perma.cc/57SC-Y76P] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
17. Id. (providing examples of undue hardship that may excuse a
prospective juror from jury service such as having an upcoming surgery
scheduled or serving as a sole caretaker of an elderly family member).
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that might show favoritism towards one side or the other.18 These
questions will focus on a potential jurors’ biases, backgrounds,
experiences, or prior knowledge they have about the case.19
Lawyers for each side can then make challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors.20 Challenges
“for cause” are generally unlimited and are used when a juror is
found to be not qualified, able, or fit to be on a jury in a particular
case.21 Lawyers are allowed a limited number of peremptory
challenges, which allow them to dismiss a potential juror for no
reason.22
Judges will dismiss potential jurors who cannot put aside
their personal opinions and be impartial when applying the law to
the facts.23 A potential juror may be excused for cause when there
is actual bias, for example, the juror admits he or she would not be
able to be impartial.24 Each side will then argue their challenges
for cause in front of the judge in a process known as “striking the
jury.”25 If the judge agrees with the challenge, the potential juror
will be removed from the panel.26 The lawyers for each side will
then alternate dismissing jurors using their peremptory
challenges.27 These challenges are limited by the court and cannot
be used to discriminate based on race or sex.28 After both parties
have agreed on the selection of a jury, the jurors are sworn in by
the court clerk.29

18. Id.; see also State v. Bruce, 745 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(Manford, D., dissenting) (expressing the view that “[f]avoritism for or against
one side or the other, be in prosecutorial or defense, has no place in our legal
system”).
19. Streicker, supra note 16.
20. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1996).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1137 (illustrating that although some jurors may be qualified,
the lawyer may excludes a juror for fear that they will favor the other party).
23. Williams, 481 Mass. at 447.
24. Streicker, supra note 16 (illustrating that when a juror’s life
experiences or character traits would make it seem unlikely that they would
be impartial, they can be removed for implied bias).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. How Courts Work – Steps in a Trial, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019)
www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_educati
on_network/how_courts_work/juryselect/ [perma.cc/8EN4-9NFD]. Peremptory
challenges, in effect, “allow a lawyer to dismiss a juror because of a belief that
the juror will not serve the best interest of the client. Peremptory challenges
are limited to a certain number determined by the kind of lawsuit being tried.
They can’t be used to discriminate on the basis of race or sex.” Id.
29. Id. (stating those that are not chosen to serve on the jury are then
excused).
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A. The Beginning of the American Legal System:
United States v. Burr
To understand the value of a trial by jury, it is necessary to
examine the methods to identify bias that have been used since
the trial by a jury process was created.30In 1807, during the
treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall
recognized the importance of identifying bias and prejudice in
prospective jurors through examination.31 In United States v.
Burr, Aaron Burr was charged with the capital crime of treason.32
Burr had been Vice President during the Thomas Jefferson
administration before killing his rival Alexander Hamilton in a
duel.33 Burr was acquitted of treason by the jury due to lack of
evidence.34 Presiding over the trial was Chief Justice John
Marshall.35 According to Chief Justice Marshall, the value of a
trial by jury is in its fairness and impartiality.36 Marshall stated
that the “common law required and the Constitution secured the
right to an impartial jury, composed of persons would fairly hear
the evidence and decide according to the evidence.”37 Those who
appreciate the judicial system do so because of the expectation
that it will be “uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind.”38 This
cannot be expected when a juror has formed an opinion, that the
person being tried is either guilty or innocent, before the facts and
testimony of the case have been presented.39 A potential juror
should not enter the courtroom with preconceived opinions that
will close their minds off from the impressions that the testimony

30. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
31 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (1807).
32. Charles F. Hobson, The Aaron Burr Treason Trial, Fed. Jud. Ctr., 1
(2006), www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/burrtrial.pdf [perma.cc/].
33. Id. (stating that this event “effectively ended Burr’s career in national
politics”).
34. Id. at 7 (stating the verdict, “instead of a simple ‘not guilty,’ declared
Burr ‘not guilty by the evidence presented’”).
35. Id. at 1.
36. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50.
37. Hobson, supra note 32, at 15 (reasoning that “those who had already
formed an opinion of the accused’s guilt were disqualified, as were those who
had formed an opinion not on the whole case but on a point so essential that it
would have an unfair influence upon the verdict”).
38. Id. (citing Justice Marshall).
I have always conceived, and still conceive, an impartial jury as
required by the common law, and as secured by the constitution, must
be composed of men who will fairly hear the testimony which may be
offered to them, and bring in their verdict according to that testimony,
and according to the law arising on it.
Id.
39. Id.
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and law of the case could potentially have on them.40 The law
suspects that a biased juror will be prevented from fairly hearing
and deciding the case on the facts and testimony that is being
offered.41 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion “points to the way to the
relevant considerations in analyzing the proper relationship
between knowledge and impartiality.”42
Personal prejudices provide for a just for cause challenge
because the individual is presumed to have bias which will prevent
an impartial decision in the case.43 The individual is not expected
to weigh the evidence as fairly as someone who has not already
made a judgment in the case.44 “It is for this reason that a juror
who has once rendered a verdict in a case, or who has been sworn
on a jury which has been divided, cannot again be sworn in the
same case.”45 Even if a prospective juror is not suspected of
personal prejudices, that individual may be deemed unfit to serve
as a juror in the case if he or she “formed and delivered an
opinion.”46 The Supreme Court recognized that, although
desirable, it is not required and perhaps impossible to obtain a
jury that is without any preconceived opinion about the guilt or
innocence of the accused.47

B. An Impartial Jury
The definition of impartiality “is not a static concept, but can
be defined only in relation to specific facts and circumstances.”48 A
fair trial is generally interpreted as being conducted before
unprejudiced jurors who are instructed by the judge as to the law
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. James J. Gobert, Criminal Law: In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 312 (1988). The considerations are as:
(1) knowledge on the part of the jurors is more or less inevitable; 2) the
more intelligent and well informed the potential juror, the more likely
he or she is to know something about the case; 3) persons generally
knowledgeable about public affairs will in most instances be more
discerning jurors than those who are generally ignorant about public
affairs; 4) a juror's impartiality is compromised only to the extent that
the juror's knowledge impedes a decision on the merits; and 5) whether
a juror's impartiality has in fact been compromised by knowledge must
be determined on an individual basis.
Id.
43. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50 (reasoning that “[h]e may declare that
notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to listen to the evidence,
and be governed by it; but the law will not trust him”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 51.
48. Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178, 179 (5th Cir. 1970).
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and facts.49 The laws of evidence are used to control a juror’s
knowledge of the case and prevent bias and prejudice.50 These
rules are designed to prevent the jurors from considering facts and
objects that may prejudice or confuse.51 It is necessary that all the
evidence “come from the witness stand in a public courtroom
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of
confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.”52 This
evidence is subject to cross-examination and rebuttal.53
“[P]rejudice must sometimes be inferred from the juror's
relationships, conduct or life experiences, without a finding of
actual bias.”54
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted that the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury in a criminal trial be “chosen
from a jury pool that represents a fair cross-section of the
community,” it has never been interpreted that the jury “represent
each and every element of the community from which it is
selected.”55 Instead, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial to serve:
The purpose of the jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power -- to make available the common sense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the over zealous or mistaken
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of the judge. This prophylactic
vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only
special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are
excluded from the pool. Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent
with our democratic heritage, but is also critical to public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system.56

The Supreme Court has found that there is no constitutional
violation without showing a “pattern of systematic exclusion of a
particular class” from the jury.57 However, Supreme Court
49. Id. at 179-80.
50. Id. at 180.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965)).
53. Id.
54. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 984.
55. Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 1987).
56. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975)).
57. Id.; see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972) (illustrating
petitioners’ argument that “unanimity is a necessary precondition for effective
application of the cross-section requirement”).
There are two flaws in this argument [that the fair cross-section
requirement requires a unanimous verdict]. One is petitioners'
assumption that every distinct voice in the community has a right to be
represented on every jury and a right to prevent conviction of a
defendant in any case. All that the Constitution forbids, however, is
systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the community from
jury panels and from the juries ultimately drawn from those panels; a
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decisions “distinguish between the requirement that jury pools
reflect a fair cross-section of the community and the requirement
that a jury be impartial.”58 It is assumed that a “trial by jury” will
include a jury that is a broad representation of the community as
well as “impartial in a specific case.”59
If a court has any doubts regarding the existence of actual
bias, they must be resolved against allowing the juror to serve.60 A
juror’s bias can be revealed by an express admission of the fact or
through circumstantial evidence.61 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Third Circuit’s observation that it is a fundamental fact that
men are more likely to favor the side with which they “identify
themselves either economically, socially, or emotionally.”62 “[T]he
jury is a ‘fundamentally human’ institution; the unavoidable fact
that jurors bring diverse backgrounds, philosophies, and
personalities into the jury room is both the strength and the
weakness of the institution.”63 This could compromise a juror’s
ability to make determinations that are based solely on the
evidence and instructions introduced in court.64
When a juror’s impartiality is questioned, the relevant issue
is “did a juror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might
hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror’s
protestation of impartiality have been believed.”65 On an appeal,
special deference is given to a trial court’s determination of a
defendant may not, for example, challenge the makeup of a jury merely
because no members of his race are on the jury, but must prove that his
race has been systematically excluded.
Id. at 413.
58. Teague, 820 F.2d at 839.
59. Id.
60. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991); see United
States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining the rule).
We have no psychic calibers with which to measure the purity of the
prospective juror; rather, our mundane experience must guide us to the
impartial jury promised by the Sixth Amendment. Doubts about the
existence of actual bias should be resolved against permitting the juror
to serve, unless the prospective panelist's protestation of a purge of
preconception is positive, not pallid.
Id.
61. United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977) (reasoning that,
“more frequently, jurors are reluctant to admit actual bias”).
62. Id. (citing Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1965)).
63. In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th 273, 296 (1999) (citing People v. Marshall,
50 Cal. 3d 907, 950 (1990)).
64. Marshall, 50 Cal. at 950. The court found that this is a weakness that
must be tolerated because “[it] is an impossible standard to require . . . [the
jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external
factors.” Id. (citing Rideau v. Louisiana 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963)).
65. Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984)).
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juror’s credibility because the trial judge was the one who saw and
heard the juror.66
Federal Courts use the McDonough test when it is alleged
that a juror deliberately concealed or withheld information.67 In
McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court
held that a new trial will be granted if the defendant
“demonstrate[s] that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire, and then further show[s] that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause.”68 McDonough involved a products liability case, where a
juror, during voir dire, was asked whether anyone in his
immediate family had ever sustained a severe injury.69 The juror
failed to reveal that his son had broken his leg after a tire
exploded.70 The Supreme Court found that the juror “apparently
believed that his son's broken leg sustained as a result of an
exploding tire was not such an injury.”71 The Court noted that
jurors may not fully understand the meaning of terms that are
often used by lawyers and judges.72

C. The Voir Dire Process
The jury is selected by the lawyers and judges in a process
known as “voir dire,” which is Latin for “to speak the truth.”73 This
method has been relied on since the trial by jury process was

66. Id. (noting a trial court's finding “that a juror was impartial is entitled
to a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence”).
67. Id.
[I]n order to obtain a new trial based on a juror’s non-disclosure during
voir dire, the defendant must first demonstrate that a juror failed to
answer honestly a material question of voir dire, and then further show
that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.
Id. at 521.
68. McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)
(explaining that "[t]he motives for concealing information may vary, but only
those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the
fairness of a trial").
69. Id. at 550.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 555.
72. Id.
73. Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing how voir
dire has been relied on as the primary safeguard for identifying juror bias).
The purpose of the voir dire process “is to elicit information from the venire
that may shed light on bias, prejudice, interest in the outcome, competence,
and the like so that counsel and the parties may exercise their judgment about
whom to seat and whom to challenge.” Id.

636

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:379

created.74 Voir dire is an important method used for “safeguarding
the right to an impartial jury.”75 This is not always an easy task
because a person may be reluctant to admit her hidden bias.76 The
Supreme Court explained that “[b]ias or prejudice is such an
elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to always recognize its existence.”77 A dishonest
prospective juror can frustrate the voir dire process.78 A juror who
is accepted after being willfully evasive and providing knowingly
untrue answers, “is a juror in name only.”79
There are several relevant facts that can be used to determine
whether a prospective juror has “both the capacity and the will to
decide the case solely on the evidence.”80 This may include “the
juror’s ability to separate her emotions from her duties . . . the
similarity between the juror’s experiences and important facts
presented at trial...the scope and severity of the juror’s dishonesty
. . . and the juror’s motive for lying.”81 The cumulative effect of the
factors should be considered by the court because any of the facts,
taken alone, may not be enough for finding a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.82

D. The General Rule for Determining Juror
Impartiality
The general rule for a judge determining juror impartiality,
is to look at whether the juror can disregard their own opinions.83
However, state and federal courts have not distinguished between
a potential juror’s opinions about a specific case and opinions
74. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038.
75. Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 163 (1st Cir. 2013); see
Correia v. Fitzgerald, 354 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that a probing
voir dire examination is “[t]he best way to ensure that jurors do not harbor
biases for or against the parties”).
76. Sampson, 724 F.3d at 164.
77. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (stating that it
“might exist in the mind of one (on account of his relations with one of the
parties) who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he was
perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything but the
evidence”).
78. Sampson, 724 F.3d at 164. (reasoning that the voir dire process is “fluid
rather than mechanical”).
79. Id. (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933).
80. Id. at 166.
81. Id. (internal citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. Williams, 481 Mass. at 448; see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554 (holding
that: “One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact – a jury capable
and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it”) (internal
quotations omitted); and Patton, 467 U.S. at 1037 n.12 (holding that “[t]he
constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court is a
question of federal law”).
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based on life experiences or world view.84
In Commonwealth v. Williams, the defendant argued on
appeal that the trial judge committed error for dismissing a
prospective juror for cause because of her work experience and
belief that the criminal justice system is unfair to AfricanAmerican men.85 During the voir dire of the prospective juror, the
trial judge attempted to determine if she could be impartial in the
trial of an African-American man despite her opinion of the
criminal justice system.86 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
found that the voir dire was incomplete because the judge “did not
inquire further to determine whether, given the prospective juror's
beliefs based on her life experiences, she nevertheless could fairly
evaluate the evidence and follow the law.”87 There, the court
reasoned that a judge should not focus “on a prospective juror's
ability to put aside his or her beliefs formed as a result of life
experiences, but rather on whether that juror, given his or her life
experiences and resulting beliefs, is able to listen to the evidence
and apply the law as provided by the judge.”88
When a prospective juror expresses an opinion, interest,
bias, or prejudice related to the case, the judge must be satisfied
that the juror will be able to set aside those opinions, properly
weigh the evidence, and follow the instructions regarding the
law.89 To reject a potential juror, the juror’s state of mind must be
such “that he cannot render an impartial judgment and that
seating him will result in substantial prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.”90 On the other hand, if a prospective juror expressed
an opinion based on her worldview or life experiences, it is
sufficient if the juror “can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented at court.”91 The
judge should not ask the prospective juror to set aside her life
experience or belief system because it would be “difficult if not
impossible to do.”92 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that
84. Williams, 481 Mass. at 448.
85. Id. at 446 (recognizing that “holding particular beliefs about how
African-American men are treated in the criminal justice system should not be
automatically disqualifying”).
86. Id. (deciding that “the prospective juror was not able to be impartial
because she expressed uncertainty about being able to ‘put aside’ her beliefs
and experiences and because she acknowledged that she would look at the
case ‘differently’ due to her experiences”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 425 (1979).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Williams, 481 Mass. at 449. “No human being is wholly free of the
interests and preferences which are the product of his cultural, family, and
community experience. Nowhere is the dynamic commingling of the ideas and
biases of such individuals more essential than inside the jury room.” Soares,
377 Mass. at 486.
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a judge “should not expect a prospective juror to set aside an
opinion born of the prospective juror's life experiences or belief
system.”93 It would be impossible and undesirable to keep a jury
from bringing their own thoughts, feelings, opinions, beliefs, and
life experiences into the court room and jury deliberation room.94

E. The Modern Trend
The Third Circuit has unequivocally held “that jurors can and
should draw upon prior life experiences and use them in the course
of deliberations.”95 In United States v. Holck, the defendants
conceded that a juror could rely on ordinary personal experience
during deliberations but argued that case law only supports
relying on “normal observations of one’s surroundings that a
person accumulates in the course of normal life.”96 They argued
that the juror’s statements were extraneous evidence because the
juror obtained the information from specialized knowledge that
was specifically related to the disputed issues.97 “A juror's specific
knowledge about a particular subject matter is not dispositive of
whether the information imparted is beyond the ken of common
experience.”98 A juror’s specialized experience, even when related
93. Williams, 481 Mass. at 449.
94. Id. at 451; see Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 817-18, 323
N.E.2d 294, 298-99 (1975) (recognizing that “such factors can affect the
intellectual judgment of a juror without any consciousness of bias or prejudice
and, for this very reason, has supported the jury system”).
Jurors do not come to their temporary judicial service as sterile
intellectual mechanisms purged of all those subconscious factors which
have formed their characters and temperaments such as racial or
ethnic background, sex, economic status, intellectual capacity, family
status, religious persuasion, political leanings, educational attainment,
moral convictions, employment experience, military service or their
individual appreciations of the social problems of the moment.
Id.; see also id. at 820 (stating that: “Juries are generally instructed by
judges in their charges and urged by counsel in their argument that they must
not leave their common sense outside the jury room”).
95. United States v. Holck, 398 F. Supp. 2d 338, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(reasoning that such conduct “does not amount to bringing in extraneous
information”); see Dickerson v. Di Guglielmo, No. 04-0752, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12342, at *17 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2004) (holding "no extrinsic evidence was
brought into jury deliberations" when, in drug case, two jurors discussed their
personal life experiences with crack cocaine).
96. Holck, 398 F. Supp. at 365. (stating that drawing upon prior life
experiences during deliberations “does not amount to bringing in extraneous
information”).
97. Id. (urging that it is not the type of “ordinary personal experience
permitted under the law”).
98. United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 275 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) "Particular information need not be known by all or even most members
of the community to constitute knowledge within the fund of ordinary
experience.” Id. at 384-85 (quoting Cocconi v. Pierre Hotel, 146 F.Supp.2d 427,
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to an issue in the case, will not be considered extraneous “so long
as it draws on personal experience.”99
While the Ninth Circuit agrees that jurors must rely on their
past personal experiences at trial, those experiences are
considered extraneous evidence when they are related to the
litigation.100 “It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her
educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a
technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at
trial.”101 The Supreme Court of California has described it as
misconduct when a juror expresses an opinion that is “explicitly
based on specialized information obtained from outside sources.”102

III. ANALYSIS
The myth of the impartial juror has been acknowledged
more in the writings of trial attorneys than by judges in their
opinions.103 “Trial manuals have long stressed the importance of
jury selection, on the premise that the same case, consisting of the
same evidence, conducted pursuant to the same trial strategy but
tried before different juries can result in different verdicts.”104 The
jury selection is one of the most critical phases of a trial, and an
attorney who can choose prospective jurors “whose life
experiences, values, and personality” relate to that of his or her
client has “won a significant battle in the overall war.”105

432 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
99. Holck, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
100. Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
“Jurors must rely on their past personal experiences when hearing a trial and
deliberating on a verdict. Where, however, those experiences are related to the
litigation, as they are here, they constitute extraneous evidence which may be
used to impeach the jury's verdict.” Id.
101. People v. Steele, 27 Cal. 4th 1230, 1265 (2002) (citing In re Malone, 12
Cal. 4th 935, 963, 911 P.2d 468, 486 (1996)).
Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by
their life experiences, including their education and professional work.
A juror, however, should not discuss an opinion explicitly based on
specialized information obtained from outside sources. Such injection of
external information in the form of a juror's own claim to expertise or
specialized knowledge of a matter at issue is misconduct.
Id.
102. Id.
103. See James J. Gobert, Criminal Law: In Search of the Impartial Jury,
79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 322 (1988) (stating that: “The
psychological baggage that human beings bring to the jury room renders
illusory any talk of a truly impartial juror”).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 322-23 (stating that the underlying premise is that “all jurors
have had their personalities and opinions shaped by their life experiences, and
that there are no impartial jurors”).
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The United States Supreme Court has not directly
addressed impartiality, as it is often absorbed in a more “general
discussion of the attributes of a constitutionally acceptable
jury.”106 The Court has said that impartiality is a “state of mind”
and not a “technical conception.”107 The Constitution provides no
particular tests for determining impartiality, and procedure is not
“chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”108 The Burr Court
recognized that it would be impossible to find a jury that was
without any preconceived opinions.109 Chief Justice Marshall
asserted that:
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a
fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions
which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered
in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony, and resist
its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.110

The Burr Court does not say that a juror must reject his or her life
experiences, but only that they must not form an opinion on the
guilt of a defendant before fairly weighing the testimony.111
106. Id. at 283 (reasoning that the Court fails to identify the specific
components of impartiality, and the Court’s decisions “raise provocative
questions, provide insight in the Court’s thinking, and merit examination”).
107. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
108. Id. at 146; see also Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 173 (1873). The
Stokes court stated that:
“[w]hile the Constitution secures the right of trial by an impartial jury,
the mode of procuring and impanelling such jury is regulated by law . . .
it is within the power of the legislature to make . . . such changes . . . ,
taking care to preserve the right of trial by an impartial jury.”
See also Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 678 (1899) (explaining the
constitutional standard further):
The provision in our constitution (paragraph 8), that the accused
should have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,
secured to the accused a right to a trial by an impartial jury by an
express constitutional provision. The means by which an impartial jury
should be obtained are not defined. In neither of the constitutional
provisions on this subject is there any requirement with respect to
challenges, or to the qualifications of jurors, or the mode in which the
jury shall be selected. These subjects were left in the discretion of the
legislature, with no restriction or limitation, except that the accused
should have the right to be tried by an impartial jury.
Id.
109. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50-51. See Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of
the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REV. 1471, 1486 (2003) (stating
that “perhaps the most difficult aspect of the voir dire process is determining
when a juror is rendered partial and thereby unfit to serve”).
110. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 51.
111. Id. (reasoning that the latter would disqualify an individual from
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This section will discuss the minority approach
demonstrated by the trial judge in Sisto, which is that a juror
must leave his or her life experiences in the jury box. Next, it will
discuss the reasoning by the Williams court, which is that it would
be impossible to ask a juror to reject his or her life experiences.
Finally, it will discuss how cases like Pippin and Malone have
allowed jurors to use their specialized education and knowledge to
assist during deliberations.

A. Depositing a Juror’s Experience into the Judge’s
Disposal Box
In Taylor v. Sisto, the trial judge emphasized the view that
a juror must reject his or her own life experiences to be
impartial.112 The trial judge instructed all of the prospective jurors
that “they must as jurors, take all the decisions that you have
made, all the opinions you have about how people act, how people
behave, what kind of people behave in what way, what makes
them do that, and you leave them in that box.”113 The only
explanation that the trial judge provided to the jurors was that
they use their experience to know “what nightfall was and where
the sun rose or set.”114 However, knowing what nightfall is and
where the sun rises are common facts, not life experiences.115 The
California Court of Appeals held that “the instruction, although a
bit odd, did not create a jury of automatic robots with sterilized
minds” and was defensible “in context.”116 As such, a court must
determine whether the jury applied the challenged instruction in a
way that prevented them from considering the relevant
evidence.117 The Sisto court suggested that the instruction may
have been harmless because it would have been impossible for
someone to “completely discard life experiences.”118
In contrast, juries are presumed to abide by the court’s
instructions even if “to follow it completely may have been

serving as a juror in the case).
112. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2010).
113. Id. (stating that they must “take all of the experiences that you have
had that have contributed to how you think about everything that you think
about and lay those experiences aside”).
114. Id.
115. Id. (holding that “[n]othing in the trial judge’s explanation permitted
a juror to draw on the personal experiences that make up human life”).
116. Id. (failing to specify the context to which it referred).
117. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (stating that “[a]lthough
a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have
been impermissibly inhibited by the instruction, a capital sentencing
proceeding does not violate the Eighth Amendment if there is only a
possibility of such an inhibition”).
118. Sisto, 606 F.3d at 626.
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impossible.”119 The Sisto court concluded that the trial judge’s
instruction “unreasonably applied a series of Supreme Court
holdings concerning the nature of a trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment.”120 The Sisto court reasoned that according to the
Supreme Court, an impartial jury is one that “applies common
sense informed by the full range of human experience.”121
The dissenting opinion in Sisto disagrees with the
majority’s finding that the Supreme Court cases formulate a rule
regarding how jurors should use their life experiences.122 “While
these cases do contain scattered dicta, broad aphorisms, and
general observations regarding the kinds of harm that flow from
discrimination in jury selection, such remarks do not amount to
clearly established Federal law on the Sixth Amendment issue
presented here.”123 The Sisto majority acknowledges that the
decisions they cited show that courts have occasionally acted as
though an individual’s life experiences can be eliminated from a
jury, and “the Supreme Court has accordingly had to vindicate the
essential requirement of diversity of humans.”124

B. Williams Aims to Prevent Judges from Asking
Jurors to do the Impossible
The Williams holding departs from the general rule that a
prospective juror should set aside his or her own life experiences
when looking at a case.125 The Williams court begins its analysis
by recognizing that “every prospective juror comes with his or her
own thoughts, feeling, opinions, beliefs.”126 However, these life
experiences may or may not affect how a prospective juror looks at
a case.127 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognizes that
jurors do not come into court with a tabula rasa or “blank slate.”128
This is based on the theory that individuals are born without any
built-in thoughts, opinions or emotions and all of the knowledge

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 628 (holding that “the ‘box’ instruction affirmed by the
California Court of Appeals instructed the jury to abandon that experience”).
122. Id. at 630 (stating that nor “does any case enunciate the so-called
‘first principle’ that courts may not eliminate ‘the experience of diverse human
beings’ from a jury”).
123. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 498 (1972) (providing an example of the kinds of harm that result
from discrimination during jury selection).
124. Sisto, 606 F.3d. at 629.
125. Williams, 481 Mass. at 453.
126. Id. at 450.
127. Id. at 450-51.
128. Id. at 460.
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comes from our life experiences.129
Jurors do not come to their temporary judicial service as sterile
intellectual mechanisms purged of all those subconscious factors
which have formed their characters and temperaments such as
racial
or
ethnic
background,
sex,
economic
status,
intellectual capacity, family status, religious persuasion, political
leanings, educational attainment, moral convictions, employment
experience, military service or their individual appreciations of the
social problems of the moment.130

The Williams court realized that it would be impossible for a
jury not to bring their life experiences into the courtroom.131
Judges generally instruct juries in their charges to bring their
common sense with them into the jury room.132 However, state and
federal courts have removed prospective jurors due to opinions
based on life experiences.133 The Williams court found that a
prospective juror “may not be excused for cause merely because he
or she believes that [certain individuals] receive disparate
treatment in the criminal justice system.”134 A prospective juror
should not be required to ignore his or her life experiences in order
to serve on a jury.135 The court distinguishes this argument from
the idea that it is proper to remove a prospective juror “who has
expressed or formed an opinion regarding the case, or has an
interest, bias, or prejudice related to the unique situation
presented by the case.”136 According to the court, a juror should not
decide the case on preconceived opinions prior to hearing all of the

129.Garcia v. Secretary of HHS, U.S. Claims LEXIS 390 *8 (Fed. Cl. 2010)
(stating that the minds of members of the bench are not a naïve tabula rasa
like “infants, tossed back and forth by the waves, and blown here and there by
every wind of teaching and by the cunning and craftiness of men in their
deceitful scheming”).
130. Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 817-18 (1975); see
Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 512 (1969) (asserting that “[e]very
individual has impressions and beliefs, likes and dislikes”).
131. Williams, 481 Mass. at 451; see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that “[i]ndividuals
are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men -- or women”).
132. Williams, 481 Mass. at 451 (reasoning that this is also urged by
counsel in their argument that juries “must not leave their common sense
outside the jury room”).
133. Id. at 450. (stating that the prospective juror was removed because of
an opinion she had that was based on prior experiences). The judge told the
prospective juror “that she would have to be able to put that out of [her] mind
and look at only the evidence.” Id.
134. Id. at 451. (reasoning that a trial judge “must take care to determine
whether such an opinion would affect a prospective juror’s ability to be
impartial” and not imply that a prospective juror must forget their life
experiences).
135. Id. at 452.
136. Soares, 377 Mass. at 482 (stating that absolute proportionality cannot
be guaranteed).
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evidence.137 However, the Williams court acknowledges that it is
appropriate for a juror to bring his or her life experience into the
jury room.138 “Asking prospective jurors to ‘put aside’ or ‘disregard;
what they think, feel, or believe comes perilously close to
improperly requiring them to ‘leave behind all that their human
experience has taught them.’”139
The Williams court was concerned that an otherwise qualified
prospective juror may be removed because a judge “mistakenly
equates an inability to disregard one’s life experiences and
resulting beliefs with an inability to be impartial.”140 In contrast,
state and federal judges have assumed, that when a prospective
juror expresses uncertainty about his or her ability to put aside
their beliefs, that juror is unable to be impartial.141 While those
concerns are valid, the Williams court holds that a prospective
juror should be excused for cause “only if, given his or her
experiences and resulting beliefs, the judge concludes that the
prospective juror is unable to fairly evaluate the evidence
presented and properly apply the law.”142

C. Is There a Fine Line Between Using One’s
Background in Analyzing the Evidence and Injecting
an Opinion Based on Specialized Information?
There has been a split among the courts that have considered
the particular issue of “whether jurors may use their professional
and educational expertise to inform their deliberations.”143 The
Williams court rejected the idea that, to be impartial, a
prospective juror is required to reject his or her life experiences in
order to serve on a jury.144 The Williams decision, however, does
not discuss whether it is proper for a juror to express an opinion

137. Williams, 481 Mass. at 452 n.7.
138. Id. at 452.
139. Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)); see Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) (stating that “[j]urors are not expected to
come into the jury box and leave behind all that their human experience has
taught them”).
140. Williams, 481 Mass. at 452.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 221-22 (2012)
(stating that a “defendant is not entitled to a jury that knows nothing about
the crime, so long as jurors are able fairly to weigh the evidence in the case,
set aside any information they learned outside the court room, follow the
judge's instructions, and render an impartial verdict”).
143. Pippin, 252 P.3d at 1063 (stating that a “minority of courts prohibit
jurors from applying their specialized knowledge to deliberations and view a
juror’s professional or educational expertise as extraneous prejudicial
information”).
144. Williams, 481 Mass. at 451.
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based on his or her background.145 In People v. Steele, the
defendant argued that several jurors, with military and medical
experience, “committed misconduct by offering their expertise to
the other jurors.”146 The defendant’s argument was based on the
rule announced in In re Malone, which stated:
It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or
employment background, to express an opinion on a technical
subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial.
Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by
their life experiences, including their education and professional
work. A juror, however, should not discuss an opinion explicitly
based on specialized information obtained from outside sources.
Such injection of external information in the form of a juror's own
claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue is
misconduct.147

During the trial of Steele, the jury was exposed to extensive
evidence regarding the defendant’s military training and Vietnam
experience.148 The Steele court found that the views of the jurors
were permissible interpretations of the evidence.149 The Steele
court reasoned that “[a]ll the jurors, including those with relevant
personal backgrounds, were entitled to consider this evidence and
express opinions regarding it.”150
Voir dire and instructions to the jury from the trial judge
serve as the “safeguards of juror impartiality,” but they are not a
guarantee.151 The Steele court began its analysis by recognizing the
fine line that exists between a juror appropriately using his or her
life experiences in analyzing the evidence versus injecting an
opinion into the jury room that is “explicitly based on specialized
information obtained from outside sources.”152 The Supreme Court
of California has held the latter to be misconduct.153 The Steele
court reasoned that a juror is permitted to use their life
experiences in evaluating and interpreting the evidence, but he or
she may not use personal expertise that is “different from or
contrary to the law as the trial court stated it or to the

145. See Steele, 27 Cal. 4th at 1265 (discussing whether or not it is proper
for a juror to express an opinion based on his or her technical, educational, or
employment background).
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting In re Malone, 12 Cal. 4th 935, 963 (1996)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1266.
150. Id.; see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (reasoning that
“it is an impossible standard to require that tribunal to be a laboratory,
completely sterilized and freed from any external factors”).
151. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (reasoning that it is
“virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that
might theoretically affect their vote”).
152. Steele, 27 Cal. 4th at 1265.
153. Id.
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evidence.”154 A juror is not an automaton, or control mechanism,
that can be programmed to follow instructions.155 He or she is a
human being that, through life experiences, has developed certain
virtues and weaknesses.156 Thus, it would be an impossibly high
standard “to permit these jurors to express an opinion on this
evidence without relying on, or mentioning, their personal
experience and background.”157
The holding in In re Malone emphasizes the view of the Steele
court that it is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her
background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long
as it is based on the evidence.158 In Malone, the petitioner
presented evidence of a polygraph examination which showed that
he was telling the truth that he did not kill the victim, but also
that he lied when he denied being at the location where she was
killed.159 At trial, the polygraph examiner testified that his
personal experience and published studies have shown accuracy of
ninety percent or more, but on cross-examination, he testified that
other studies produced accuracy around sixty percent.160 During
deliberations a juror, who had studied psychology, expressed
negative opinions on the reliability of polygraph evidence that was
presented during trial.161 She told the other jurors that her beliefs
were “based on her reading rather than on her own experimental
research.”162 The Supreme Court of California held that the juror’s
154. Id. at 1266. “[D]uring the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually
impossible to divorce completely one’s background from one’s analysis of the
evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in
the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background
during deliberations.” Id.
155. Id.; see In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 654 (1995) (stating “[i]f the
system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection
short of actual bias”).
156. Steele, 27 Cal. 4th at 1266.
157. Id. at 1267 (holding that the trial court properly determined the
declarations to be “merely expressions of opinions, informed by the juror’s life
experiences, regarding evidence subject to varying interpretations”).
158. In re Malone, 12 Cal. 4th at 963.
159. Id. at 942.
160. Id. at 964.
161. Id. at 942.
162. Id. at 948. The juror had told her fellow jurors:
[T]hat she was not an expert on polygraphs, but had read and discussed
professional articles on the subject in the course of her studies in
psychology; that while polygraph examiners claim an accuracy rate of
80 to 90 percent, Irwin was skeptical of that claim because independent
researchers had found accuracy rates of only 50 to 60 percent; and that
a key question petitioner answered truthfully, according to the
examiner--whether he had killed, as Irwin remembered it being
phrased, ‘the woman in Baker’--was not probative on his guilt because
the woman was not killed in Baker, but some distance away near
Daggett.
Id.
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assertions did not warrant reversal because they were
“substantially the same as evidence and argument presented at
trial.”163 They were not assertions about “what the law is or what
the law should be;” an improper determination by a juror.164
In Kendrick v. Pippin, the Supreme Court of Colorado
recognized that their precedent did not address “whether jurors
may use their professional and educational experiences to assist
their deliberation.”165 In Pippin, the plaintiff argued that the jury
was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information when a juror
shared her calculations regarding the automobile accident with
other jurors.166 The juror in question made her own calculations
estimating the defendant’s speed, distance, and reaction time and
shared those calculations with the other jurors.167
The Pippin court held that a juror’s statements “based on
such experiences do not constitute extraneous prejudicial
information.”168 The juror “simply applied her professional
experience and her knowledge of mathematics” without
introducing legal content or factual information from outside
sources.169
Although most courts have departed from the idea of
requiring jurors to reject their life experiences to be impartial,
there are still some judges that believe a juror’s life experiences
should be left in the jury box.170 In Sisto, the trial judge wanted
the jurors to completely disregard their life experiences.171
Similarly in Williams, the trial court dismissed a prospective juror
under the belief that her life experiences would cause her to look
at the case differently from other jurors.172 Courts like Steele and
Pippin have held that jurors should be able to apply their life
experiences and knowledge.173 How can trial courts continue to ask

163. Id. at 965.
164. In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 399 (1985) (stating it is a
“fundamental and historic precept of our judicial system that jurors are
restricted solely to the determination of factual questions and are bound by
the law as given them by the court”); see Smoketree-Lake Murray v. Mills
Concrete Construction Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1724, 1749 (1991) (holding that a
juror’s demonstration “constituted misconduct because it brought new
evidence into the deliberations”).
165. Pippin, 252 P.3d at 1063.
166. Id. (stating that “the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary
hearing on the allegations of juror misconduct”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (reasoning “[j]urors may use their background, including
professional and educational experiences, to inform their deliberations so long
as they do not introduce legal content or specific factual information learned
from outside the record”).
170. Sisto, 606 F.3d at 626.
171. Id.
172. Williams, 481 Mass. at 448.
173. Pippin, 252 P.3d at 1063; Steele, 27 Cal. at 1265.
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jurors to do the impossible? In sum, the United States Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the issue, and nor does the
Constitution lay out certain rules or tests regarding juror
impartiality.174

IV. PROPOSAL
This section proposes solutions to protect prospective jurors
from being dismissed based on their life experiences. First, it will
discuss how Williams demonstrates that, to be impartial, a juror
need not reject his or her life experiences.175 Next, how courts
should be mandated to analyze this question using Williams,
Pippin and Malone. Then, this section will address a solution of
implementing a federal statute in the United States Code (U.S.C.),
where a juror shall disqualify himself when impartiality might be
reasonably questioned along with the penalties for noncompliance.

A. Where There is a Will[iams] There is a Way
The holding in Williams supports the idea that, to be
impartial, a juror must not reject his or her own life experiences.176
The reasoning by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was not
mandated by statute or derived from a test that was developed by
the United States Supreme Court.177 The Williams court observed
what it means to be a human being, full of life experiences that are
the “product of his cultural, family, and community experience.”178
Many prospective jurors will have already formed opinions
regarding the particular case they are instructed to observe. A
person develops these opinions and biases over time through their
life experiences. Without these life experiences, a person would be
unable to fairly evaluate the evidence and properly apply the law.
The jury box would be filled with newborns who are unable to
process what they are being presented, or robots who are all
programed exactly the same way. This would not be an adequate
representation of the community. A juror would have no education,
work experience, or relationships to reference during
deliberations. The holding in Williams makes it clear that a
prospective juror should never be asked to reject his or her life
experiences.179 A judge may inquire about a juror’s background
174. Wood, 299 U.S. at 145.
175. Williams, 481 Mass. at 446.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 453.
178. Id. at 449.
179. Id. at 451. (stating “[i]t would neither be possible nor desirable to
select a jury whose members did not bring their life experiences to the court
room and to the jury deliberation room”).
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during voir dire, but his or her life experiences should not be the
reason for dismissal.
The holdings in Malone and Pippin go even further by
allowing jurors to use not only their life experiences but to apply
their
professional
experience
and
knowledge
during
deliberations.180 This is what makes each and every person
different. It is only natural for someone to rely on their education
and work experience when interpreting facts. This allows each
member of the jury to acquire new evidence in different ways. If all
of the jurors had similar past experiences, they would hold similar
expectations about the world. This may increase group cohesion,
“but it can also have a negative effect on group decisions.”181 For
example, “members of the same political party are likely to
interpret incoming data in the same way regardless of whether
they discuss their interpretation with each other.”182
To be a “body truly representative of the community,” jurors
must come from different backgrounds and share different
personal characteristics.183 Neither a judge, a prosecutor, nor a
defense attorney should be allowed to create a jury that is the
“organ of any special group or class.”184 Although it may benefit
one of the parties, it does not “comport with the concept of the jury
as a cross-section of the community.”185 We cannot allow courts to
depart from the traditional requirements of a jury trial because of
the desire of one party to assemble a similar group. Although the
goal is to remove bias from the courtroom, this strategy may
consequently result in bias when all members of the jury are from
the same organization or have received the same training.186
Courts should be mandated to analyze these questions using the
180. Pippin, 252 P.3d at 1063; In re Malone, 12 Cal. at 963.
181. Dan Bang & Chris Frith, Making Better Decisions in Groups, NCBI
(Aug.
16,
2017),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5579088/
[perma.cc/2B2A-XSUC].
182. Id.
183. Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (stating that “[t]endencies, no
matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a
process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily
resisted”).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
No matter how high-principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate
public virtue such organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such a
method of selection are the more real when the members of those
organizations, from training or otherwise, acquire a bias in favor of the
prosecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an
organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in
addition, it is also openly partisan.
Id.
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reasoning set forth in Williams, Pippin, and Malone. This will
require the United States Supreme Court to take a case involving
these issues in order to create precedent that other courts will
have to follow.
The case law discussed above demonstrates that some judges
are still requiring jurors to do the impossible.187 Instructing a
prospective juror to reject his or life experiences and base their
decision solely on the facts and evidence presented in court is
asking too much.188 Ironically, judges are not asked to leave their
life experiences in the robing room prior to making rulings in
court.189 “All judges come to the bench with a background of
experiences, associations, and viewpoints.”190 According to Justice
Rehnquist, “[p]roof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of
bias.”191 Similarly, a juror’s life experiences should not be observed
as evidence of bias, but instead as his or her qualifications to serve
on a jury.

B. A Federal Statute for Jurors that models 28 U.S.C. §
455. Disqualification of Justice, Judge, or
Magistrate Judge
The United States Code Section 455 is a recusal statute
that is meant to protect litigants from biased and prejudiced
judges.192 While this section provides rules for judges, there is no
statute that is meant to protect litigants from biased and
prejudiced jurors.193 Judges, like jurors, bring unique life
187. Pippin, 252 P.3d at 1063.
188. Sisto, 606 F.3d at 626.
189. Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on Why Judges
Wear
Black
Robes,
SMITHSONIAN
(Nov.
2013),
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/justice-sandra-day-oconnor-on-why-judgeswear-black-robes-4370574/ [perma.cc/4VFT-EPHZ] (stating that the robing
room is “the court’s versions of a locker room”).
190. Easley v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir.
1988).
191. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972).
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their
middle years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time
formulated at least some tentative notions that would influence them
in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and
their interaction with one another. It would be not merely unusual, but
extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to
constitutional issues in their previous legal careers.
Id.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2019).
193. Wood, 299 U.S. at 145.
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experiences with them into court. Judges are not asked to reject
their life experiences, but instead are asked to set aside any bias
resulting from those experiences.194 The Seventh Circuit has
observed:
[I]n the real world, “possible temptations” to be biased abound.
Judges are human; like all humans, their outlooks are shaped by
their lives’ experience. It would be unrealistic to suppose that judges
do not bring to the bench those experiences and the attendant biases
they may create. A person could find something in the background of
most judges which in many cases would lead that person to conclude
that the judge has a “possible temptation” to be biased. But not all
temptations are created equal. We expect--even demand—that
judges rise above these potential biasing influences, and in most
cases we presume judges do.195

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Del Vecchio v. Illinois
Department of Corrections, although regarding a judge, can be
compared to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts analysis in
Williams.196 Both courts acknowledge that a person’s outlook,
whether they are a judge or a juror, is shaped by their life
experiences.197
“[T]he judicial system hopes for a judge possessing experience
and knowledge of the workings of the world and the cogs of his
community rather than a judge with a vacuumed mind.”198 Despite
the similarity in analysis, judges and jurors are subject to different
rules when dealing with impartiality.
To ensure deliberate, unbiased fact-finding, Congress can
eliminate this dual standard between judges and jurors by
amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 to include disqualification of juror. This
section of the statute would read as follows:
(a) Any juror shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also
disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or
the juror or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he,
194. Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994).
195. Id.
196. Id.; Williams, 481 Mass. at 448.
197. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1372; Willaims, 481 Mass. At 448.
198. In re Estate of Hayes, 185 Wash. App. 567, 598 (2015) (stating “after
all, judges do not leave their common experience and common sense outside
the courtroom door”).
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individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing
in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a
person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is
known by the juror to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the juror’s
knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (c) A
juror
should
inform
himself
about
his
personal
and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to
inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse
and minor children residing in his household.199
199. § 455 (a)-(f). This statute would be modified to apply to jurors in the
same way that it applies to justices, judges, and magistrate judges. Similarly,
a juror would be expected to recuse himself when his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned and whenever any of five criteria exist.
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the
following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as
lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material
witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in governmental
employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or
material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding; (5)He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree
of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is
a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to
have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding. (c) A judge should inform himself about his
personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort
to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse
and minor children residing in his household. (d)For the purposes of
this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning
indicated: (1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or
other stages of litigation; (2) the degree of relationship is calculated
according to the civil law system; (3) “fiduciary” includes such
relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4)“financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
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To ensure impartiality, jurors and judges, each having unique
life experiences as members of the community, would then be
subject to the same guidelines. With the amended statute, a juror
would be required to disqualify him or herself under the same
circumstances as a judge. A juror would also be allowed to bring
his or her life experiences into the courtroom. As with a judge,
society would presume that a juror would set aside any potential
biases derived from those past experiences.
Our legal system places great importance upon a trial by
jury. This is derived from the “special confidence we repose in a
body of one’s peers to determine guilt or innocence,” and it
deserves to be protected.200
If a juror’s partiality would have constituted grounds for a challenge
for cause during jury selection or for discharge during trial, but the
juror’s concealment of such a state of mind is not discovered until
after trial and verdict, the juror’s actual bias constitutes misconduct
that warrants a new trial.201

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds
securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the
judge participates in the management of the fund; (ii) An office in an
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not
a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization; (iii) The
proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company,
of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary
interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome
of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest; (iv)
Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the
issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect
the value of the securities. (e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge
shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground
for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for
disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be
accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the
basis for disqualification. (f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions
of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy
judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after
substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the
appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her,
that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or
minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in
a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge,
magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case
may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the
grounds for the disqualification.
200. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (reasoning that “[i]t is
this safeguarding function, preferring the commonsense judgment of a jury as
a bulwark against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge, that lies at the core of our dedication to
the principles of jury determination of guilt or innocence”).
201. People v. Nesler, 16 Cal. 4th 561, 581 (1997).
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To guard against juror misconduct, certain penalties should
be in place for those who violate the disqualification of juror
statute. Any juror who fails to disqualify himself because his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned may be charged with
Obstruction of Justice.202 If convicted, the juror shall be fined or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.203

V. CONCLUSION
The judicial system relies on the impartiality of judges and
jurors. For this to occur, a judge or juror need not have his or her
mind erased prior to trial. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Williams adopted the position that it was not necessary for a
prospective juror to reject his or her life experiences to be
impartial.204 Cases like Sisto, show the need for a uniform statute
regarding juror impartiality.205 Sisto demonstrates the minority
approach that prospective jurors, prior to looking at the case, must
forget every opinion, decision, and observation they ever made.206
Both judges and jurors are given great responsibility, trusted to be
impartial and unbiased, but yet their qualifications to serve are
determined by different standards. As human beings, individuals,
and people of the community, are they really that different to
allow the use of life experiences for one but yet tell the other that
they must reject them? The result of Williams demonstrates that
the question should be answered in the negative.

[A]ctual bias supporting an attack on the verdict is similar to actual
bias warranting a juror’s disqualification….Actual bias in this context
is defined as the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in
reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the
juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of any party.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (2021).
203. Id.
204. Williams, 481 Mass. at 451.
205. Sisto, 606 F.3d at 626.
206. Id.

